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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JARED CASANOVA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020527-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-302 (1999), attempted theft, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999), failure to respond to an officer's signal to 
stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 1999), and 
attempted escape, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2002), the Supreme Court transferred this appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. R. 154. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court clearly err in finding that the prosecutor's strike of Juror 4 was 
not racially motivated? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's finding regarding the motivation underlying a 
peremptory strike "generally turns on the credibility of the of the proponent of the strike and 
will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 
548 (Utah 1996). 
2. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to dismiss the aggravated 
robbery charge for insufficient evidence where the victim unequivocally identified defendant 
as the person who stole his car and testified that defendant reached under his shirt as if to pull 
a gun when the victim confronted him? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to 
establish a prima facie case is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Stringham, 
2001 UT App 13, Tf 26,17 P.3d 1153. The trial court's prima facie ruling is reviewed "under 
the same standard applied to a claim that insufficient evidence exists to support a jury 
verdict." State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989); accord State v. Taylor, 884 
P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994). Accordingly, this Court "will uphold a trial court's 
denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence if, "'upon reviewing the evidence and 
all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from i t , . . . some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
2 
reasonable doubt/" State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ^ 8, 988 P.2d 949 (quoting 
D/fo?//0,78OP.2dat 1225). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
1 1 le folic " * ing coi istit i itional pi ov isions, stat i ites, ai id r tiles are relevant to a 
determination of this case: 
Utah Code Ann. 8 76-6-301 (1999) 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or feai of 
immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1999) 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
• robbery,, he 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during 
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery (count I), attempted theft (count II), 
failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop (count III), attempted escape (count IV), and 
giving a false identity to a peace officer (count V). R. 2-5. Following a preliminary hearing, 
defendant was bound over for trial on all charges. R. 156: 67. After the State rested at trial, 
defendant moved to dismiss counts I, II, and V for insufficient evidence. R. 158: 276-79, 
282-83,285-86. The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss counts I and II, but granted 
his motion to dismiss count V. R. 158: 281-82, 285, 287. The jury subsequently found 
defendant guilty ofthe remaining counts as charged. R. 107-10; R. 158:350-60. Defendant 
moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on count I, but that motion was denied. 
R. 158:362-64. 
After receiving victim impact statements and a presentence investigation report, the 
court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of five-years-to-life for aggravated 
robbery and zero-to-five years for failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop. R. 128-29. 
The court sentenced defendant to a concurrent prison term of zero-to-five years for 
attempted theft, but imposed no sentence for attempted escape. R. 128-29. Defendant timely 
appealed. R. 138-39. 
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Summary of Facts 
j u s t a | t e r y.QQ a m o n November 8, 2001, 18-year-old Jake Kesler was at home 
preparing for work R 157: 109, 149. Shoeless, Kesler walked through the garage to his 
parked car in the driveway and started the engine to warm it up " He 
nliiinrd to tin linusc lii finish
 Htit*f 1 inJIJ R\id\ tor notl ,tiul fur n mutes laftT, sal down on fhr 
steps of the garage to put on his work boots R. 157: 109, \s he laced up his boots, he 
saw a car slowly drive by, stop just past his house, and someone exit the car and approach the 
l i o i i i s i ' II1"" III!''! ' I  I I I '" I Vi h i / s i n l l i t i i In", i n ! I n s r . n d i o r o p e n .mild n I »i R I S n , | || I  |/" 
135. Kesler immediately rushed to his car, opened the door, and saw defendant seated 
behind the steering wheel. R. 157:112-13,135-36,152. Without a word, defendant reached 
lln i n i i i i d c i Hi! I l inl ( o I n w i i ' i l \\ iillii In*, i i i ' h t I  I. n in II - i s ill h e \\\ r r u r n n i ; liming t m i w e a p o n ' 
R# i57 ; 113-14,137,152-54. Upon seeing this, Kesler ran back to his house screaming that 
someone was stealing his car and that he had a gun R 157: 115, 138, 153; R. 158: 252. 
A few seconds later, Kesler went back outside and saw defendant backing the car out 
of the driveway. R. 157: 116, 139-40. Hie car stalled momentarily, but then sped off. 
R 157: 116, 140; R. 158: 253. Kesler and his mother got into her forerunner and chased 
after defendant R 158: 2:54 55, 266 \ s his mother followed defendant through their 
neighborhood, Kesler telephoned police on his mother's cell phone, keeping them abreast of 
their location. R 157: 115-120, 139-44; R. 158: 256-59. Officer Phillip Ellertson of the 
South Jordan Police Department joined the pursuit about ten minutes later, some nine blocks 
\ • , ' • •' • • . ' • • - . . 5 ' • - . ' ' • ' • • ' • - ' ' ' . • ' 
Officer EUertson pursued defendant south on Bangeter Highway, reaching speeds of 
up to 95 miles per hour. R. 157: 124, 163-65; R. 158:261. As defendant approached 11400 
South, he abruptly cut across traffic and turned into a dead end road. R. 157: 124, 165-66. 
As defendant tried to turn around, he crashed into a chain link fence and became stuck. 
R. 157: 124, 166. Officer EUertson exited his patrol car, walked up to within two to three 
feet of defendant with his gun drawn, tapped on the window, and ordered defendant out of 
the car. R. 157: 124, 166-68, 188; R. 158:261. Defendant ignored the officer's command, 
freed the car from the impediment, and sped off through an open field. R. 157: 125, 168; 
R. 158:261,271-72. 
Unwilling to pursue defendant through the field, Officer EUertson maneuvered his 
way on the roads to the other end of the field at 118000 South, but defendant was nowhere to 
be seen. R. 157: 169; R. 158: 262. However, a motorist advised Officer EUertson that the 
car had gone westbound on 118000 South. R. 157: 170; R. 158: 263. Officer EUertson 
resumed his pursuit and again saw the stolen car as it approached Highway U-l 11. R. 157: 
170-71; R. 158: 263. Although the stolen car had by this time suffered a flat tire, defendant 
passed the cars in front of him and sped off northbound on U-l 11, reaching speeds of up to 
75 miles per hour. R. 157: 171-72, 232-33. Ignoring the traffic hazards around him, 
defendant sped through the intersection of U-l 11 and the New Bingham Highway. R. 157: 
173. By this time, a second tire on the stolen car was also flat. R. 157: 173. 
As they traveled northbound on U-l 11, a second South Jordan patrol car joined the 
pursuit. R. 157: 173,230-31. Defendant ran over a spike strip deployed by a West Jordan 
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officer, which flattened the rest of the tires. . 157: 174-75, 193. Defendant nevertheless 
continued his flight, turning eastbound on 5400 South. R. 157: 174-75, 193. Although 
defendant was losing rubber and pieces of rim, he continued down 5400 South at speeds of 
50 miles per hour. R. 157: 175-76, 195. Defendant sped through the intersection at 5600 
West, which had been cleared by a county sheriffs deputy. R. 157: 176,215-17. Some three 
blocks later, defendant crossed over the oncoming lanes, jumped the curb into a small cul-de-
sac, and turned left onto a small residential street. R. 157: 176-77. After slowing down, 
defendant lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a parked car. R. 157: 177,218-20,233. 
Kesler's car was "totalled." R. 157: 130-31. 
After defendant crashed, Officer Ellertson drove his patrol car up to the stolen car, 
pinning the driver's side door. R. 157: 178, 220. Undaunted, defendant exited out the 
passenger side door and fled into a backyard. R. 157:178,200-01,220. As he tried to climb 
over a fence, Officer Ellertson and a sheriffs deputy wrestled him to the ground and 
handcuffed him. R. 157: 178,197,201,220-21,234. Officer Ellertson placed defendant in 
the backseat of his patrol car and backed his car away from the stolen car. R. 157: 179-81, 
221, 234. Later, as Officer Ellertson discussed the crime with other officers on the scene, 
defendant crawled into the front seat of the patrol car through a small window separating the 
front and back seats and attempted to drive away. R. 157: 182, 199, 222, 235-36. Officer 
Ellertson and two other officers immediately jumped into the car and wrested defendant from 
the steering wheel. R. 157: 183,222,236-37. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Batson Claim. The prosecutor offered a facially valid reason for striking Juror 4. 
Defendant's emphasis on the validity of the prosecutor's assumptions in making the strike is 
misplaced. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's acceptance of the 
prosecutor's explanation was clearly erroneous. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Defendant's identity as the robber was established by 
the direct testimony of the victim. The victim also testified that when he confronted 
defendant in his car, defendant responded by reaching under his shirt to his waist as if to 
draw a weapon. This testimony was sufficient to warrant submission to the jury of the issues 
of identity and the use of force or fear. Discrepancies in the victim's description of the 
perpetrator and the validity of his interpretation of defendant's gestures are issues within the 
sole province of the factfinder. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTOR'S 
STRIKE OF JUROR 4 WAS NOT RACIALLY MOTIVATED WAS 
NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor's strike of Juror 4, Alfredo Gonzales, was 
racially motivated and that the trial court erred in denying his objection to the strike. Aplt. 
Brf. at 9-10. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND THEIR LIMITS 
As a general rule, "prosecutors have the freedom to base peremptory challenges on 
any reasons related to their views of the outcome of the case to be tried." State v. Pharris, 
846 P.2d 454,462 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). That rule, however, 
"is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986). Thus, while the parties in a criminal action are 
"permitted to exercise their peremptory challenges for virtually any reason, or for no reason 
at all," they are "not [permitted to] discriminate against potential jurors by exercising 
peremptory challenges solely on the basis of race.'" State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,16, 
41 P.3d 1153 (quoting State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, U 14, 994 P.2d 177). 
A challenge to a peremptory strike alleging purposeful discrimination involves a 
three-step process. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-71 (1995); 
accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8, at 117, 994 P.2d 177. First, "[f]he challenging party must [ ] 
make out [a] prima facie case [of racial discrimination] by presenting facts adequate to raise 
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an inference of improper discrimination." Id. at f 18; accord Elem, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 
S.Ct. at 1770. If a prima facie case is made, "the burden of production shifts to the proponent 
of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two)." Elem, 514 U.S. at 
767, 115 S.Ct. at 1770; accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8, at f 19. "If a race-neutral reason is 
tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has 
proved purposeful racial discrimination." Elem, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. at 1770; accord 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, at f 19. 
B. THE PROSECUTOR'S STRIKE OF JUROR 4 WAS NOT RACIALLY 
MOTIVATED 
1. The State Waived Any Challenge to Defendant's Prima Facie 
Showing 
After the prosecutor exercised his fourth and final peremptory strike against Juror 4, 
defendant challenged the strike, alleging that it was racially motivated. R. 157: 83. Before 
the could rule on whether a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination had been made, 
and without challenging defendant's showing, the prosecutor offered an explanation for the 
strike. See R. 157: 84. Therefore, the issue of whether a prima facie case was established by 
defendant has been waived by the State. See State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545,547 (Utah 
1996) (holding that "[w]here the proponent of the peremptory challenge fails to contest the 
sufficiency of the prima facie case at trial and merely provides a rebuttal explanation for the 
challenge, the issue of whether a prima facie case was established is waived); accord 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,359,111 S.Ct. 1859,1866 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
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2. Defendant Concedes That the Prosecutor Offered a Facially Valid 
Explanation for the Peremptory Strike 
The prosecutor explained that he struck Juror 4 because he "didn't particularly like 
[his] answers in regards to a question that [defense counsel] suggested to the court [about] 
their leisure activities." R. 157: 84. The prosecutor advised the court that he circled Juror 
4's response of "relaxation therapy," which, he explained, "struck [him] as odd, and struck 
him as a more liberal type of activity, and perhaps being a more liberal type of individual [he] 
would give more weight to the defendant than he probably should." R. 157: 84. The 
prosecutor's explanation was, on its face, unrelated to race. See Elem, 514 U.S. at 768,115 
S.Ct. at 1771. Defendant has not challenged the facial validity of the prosecutor's response, 
conceding that "concern over a venireman's liberal tendencies has been held to be a facially 
acceptable explanation." Aplt. Brf. at 16-17 (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18,23 (Fla.), 
cert denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988)). 
3. Defendant Did Not Prove Purposeful Racial Discrimination 
The only issue on appeal, therefore, is whether defendant satisfied the third step of the 
Batson test, "prov[ing] purposeful racial discrimination." Elem, 514 U.S. at 767,115 S.Ct. at 
1770; accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8, at f 19. "This determination generally turns on the 
credibility of the proponent of the strike and [the trial court's finding] will not be set aside 
unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996). "To 
show clear error, the appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
11 
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack." Id. 
Defendant has not carried his burden. At trial, defendant offered nothing to support 
his claim that the prosecutor's strike was racially motivated. Because "the burden is on the 
defendant to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination," his claim must therefore fail. 
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 595 (Utah 1988). 
Defendant nevertheless attempts to cure his lack of proof at trial by offering, for the 
first time on appeal, reasons to discount the prosecutor's explanation. In a nutshell, 
defendant's claim seeking reversal rests on the proposition that the prosecution's explanation 
for the strike was not valid or otherwise reasonable. Aplt. Brf. at 16-24. Quoting State v. 
Slappy, 522 So.2d 18,23 (Fla.), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988), defendant contends that 
before a trial court may accept the race-neutral explanation of the prosecutor, "'the state must 
be prepared to support its explanations with neutral reasons based on answers provided at 
voir dire or otherwise disclosed on the record itself.'" Aplt. Brf. at 17 (emphasis added). 
Then, relying heavily on the rationale of Slappy, defendant argues that nothing in the record 
supports the prosecutor's conclusion that Juror 4 was in fact liberal and that the prosecutor's 
failure to verify his intuition with follow-up questions demonstrated that the explanation was 
a pretext for a racially-motivated strike. Aplt. Brf. at 20-21. He then points out that the 
record revealed no alleged bias in Juror 4 and he argues that the hobbies of other jurors might 
also have suggested a liberal bias. Aplt. Brf. at 22-23. 
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Defendant cites no Utah case supporting the kind of reasonableness test he espouses. 
Instead, he relies on the analysis applied in Slappy. Under Slappy, once the opponent of the 
strike makes a prima facie showing, the actual burden of proof (not just the burden of 
production) shifts to the proponent of the strike to rebut the inference of discrimination. 
Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22. Such a shift in the burden of persuasion is contrary to the 
pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court. As held in Elem, "the ultimate burden 
of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of 
the strike." Elem, 514 U.S. at 768,115 S.Ct. at 1771 (emphasis added). Slappy's divergence 
from Supreme Court precedent can be explained by the law against which it judged 
peremptory strikes. Slappy judged the selection of jurors not under the United States 
Constitution, but under the Florida Constitution, which the court held "exceeds the current 
federal guarantees." Id. at 20-21. The Slappy analysis, therefore, has no place here. 
The Slappy analysis should be discounted for a second reason. The Florida Supreme 
Court has since rejected Slappy's focus on reasonableness. In Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 
759,764 (Fla. 1996), Florida's high court held that "[t]he court's focus in step 3 is not on the 
reasonableness of the explanation but rather its genuineness." Continuing, the court held that 
"[t]hroughout this process, the burden of persuasion never leaves the opponent of the strike to 
prove purposeful racial discrimination." Id. at 764. While acknowledging that 
reasonableness is one factor in assessing genuineness, the court emphasized that 
"peremptories are presumed to be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner" and that "the 
13 
trial court's decision turns primarily on an assessment of credibility and will be affirmed on 
appeal unless clearly erroneous." Id. at 764-65 & n.9. 
Requiring the proponent of a strike to ask follow up questions and otherwise support 
his or her intuitions about possible juror bias would have the effect of impermissibly shifting 
the burden of proof. Defendant's focus on the validity of the explanation also ignores the 
inexact nature of peremptory strikes. In this regard, the Nebraska Supreme Court observed: 
"Jury selection is, in itself, an inexact science, based as often on hunches and 
inferences about human behavior as on hard facts. By their very nature, 
peremptory challenges particularly lend themselves to the application of 
popular psychology, the consideration of unarticulated values, and the varied 
experiences—both at trial and in life—of the attorneys who use them." 
State v. Rowe, 423 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Neb. 1988) (quoting People v. King, 195 Cal.App.3d 
923,932-33,241 Cal.Rptr. 189,194-95(1987)). And, as observed by the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, "[e]ven in the wake of Batson andJ.E.B., prosecutors remain free to 'use horse 
sense' and 'play hunches' in exercising peremptory challenges so long as the factors they 
rely on are race- and gender-neutral." State v. Shaw, 14 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Mo. App. 2000). In 
short, "a peremptory challenge can be made even for a mistaken reason so long as it is not 
racially motivated." Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549 n.3 (emphasis added). 
In this case, defendant argues that the record revealed no alleged bias in Juror 4. Aplt. 
Brf. at 22. Likewise, however, the record revealed no alleged bias in any of the prospective 
jurors that survived challenges for cause. Indeed, all peremptory strikes are taken against 
jurors whom the trial court has passed for cause. As emphasized in Batson, "the prosecutor's 
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explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause/' Batsotu 
476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. 
Defendant criticizes the State for not striking Juror 19 (Carolyn Olsen), who had 
family involved in law enforcement, and Juror 1 (Karen Gorzitze), who knew Juror 19. Aplt. 
Brf. at 23. Neither of these factors suggest that these jurors would hold a bias against the 
prosecution. Accordingly, the prosecutor had no reason to strike these two jurors. Finally, 
defendant speculates that the same liberal tendencies may have been imputed to the jurors 
that were not married or liked to camp (Jurors 5 & 8). Aplt. Brf. at 23. This assumption, 
however, is based on defense counsel's own unscientific hunches, not necessarily shared by 
the prosecutor. 
In short, defendant has offered nothing that casts doubt on the genuineness of the 
prosecutor's strike. As noted by defendant, the prosecutor himself was Hispanic. See Aplt. 
Brf. at 18. The trial court was well aware of this fact. And as in Higginbotham, the trial 
court "was involved in the voir dire process and observed first-hand the prosecutor's 
demeanor in responding to [defendant's] allegations of racial discrimination." 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. In a nutshell, defendant seeks reversal on appeal for no 
other reason than he disagrees with the prosecutor's rationale in concluding that Juror 4 
might be liberal and sympathetic to defendant. Specifically, he criticizes the plausibility of 
making such inferences based on an individual's hobby. Yet, it was defendant who proposed 
that the court ask the prospective jurors to identify their "hobbies and leisure time activities." 
R. 44 (proposed jury questions). Because defendant has failed to demonstrate that the 
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prosecutor's explanation was merely a pretext to strike the juror for discriminatory purposes, 
this Court should reject defendant's claim.1 
II. THE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUBMIT THE QUESTION TO THE 
JURY 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss count I, 
aggravated robbery. Aplt. Brf. at 26-37. Specifically, defendant argues that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish his identity as the robber and to establish that he used force or 
fear. Aplt. Brf. at 31, 33. Defendant's claim fails. 
"In order to submit a question to the jury, . . . the prosecutor [must] present some 
evidence of every element needed to make out a cause of action." State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 
568, 570 (Utah 1985); accord State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, f 5, 988 P.2d 452. 
Accordingly, a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence will be 
upheld so long as "'some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Kihlstrom, 
1999 UT App 289, f 8,988 P.2d 949 (quoting Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1225). The Court reviews 
1
 Defendant argues that the court's findings were inadequate. Aplt. Brf. at 24-26. 
However, the record adequately demonstrates that the trial court believed the prosecutor's 
explanation was genuine. As noted by this Court in State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 156 
(Utah App. 1997), "[tjhere will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best 
evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge." 
(quotations omitted). Defendant has identified nothing that would suggest the court's finding 
was clearly erroneous. 
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the evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence in a light most favorable to the 
State. State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994). 
A. THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S 
IDENTITY AS THE ROBBER 
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was the 
robber. Aplt. Brf. at 31. Based on certain alleged differences between Kesler's description 
of the robber to police dispatch and defendant's actual appearance at the time, defendant 
speculates that an accomplice initially entered Kesler's car, but that defendant switched 
places with him when Kesler ran back to the house to tell his parents. Aplt. Brf. at 31-32. 
While defendant was free to present this theory to the jury, the prosecution was only required 
to present "some evidence" of defendant's identity as the robber to warrant submission of 
that question to the jury. See Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, at J 8 (quoting Dibello, 780 P.2d 
at 1225). The prosecution met that burden. 
Kesler testified that when he opened the driver's side door of his car, he observed "a 
person sitting in [his] vehicle" behind the steering wheel. R. 157: 113, 152. He then 
positively identified that person as defendant. R. 157: 113,152. He further testified that as 
the car pulled out of the driveway and momentarily stalled, he again observed "the same 
individual" in his car. R. 157: 116. This testimony is more than sufficient to warrant 
submission of the issue of defendant's identity to the jury. 
Defendant nevertheless complains that Kesler's description of the man he initially 
confronted in his car was inconsistent with his appearance at the time of the offense. 
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Specifically, he takes issue with Kesler's report to police dispatch that the perpetrator was 
Tongan or Polynesian, with dark hair and a mustache and goatee. Aplt. Brf. at 32. This 
complaint, however, goes to the weight and credibility of Kesler's identification, not to the 
lack of identification evidence. As the Utah Supreme Court observed, "discrepancies in 
descriptions . . . go to the credibility of the witness, which is best determined by the 
factfinders." State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1983). 
In any event, Kesler's description to dispatch was not wholly inconsistent with 
defendant's actual appearance. Although defendant is Hispanic, rather than Polynesian, 
Kesler accurately described him as "dark skinned" with "dark hair." R. 157: 123-24. And 
contrary to defendant's contention on appeal, Aplt. Brf. at 32, the photograph taken of 
defendant following his arrest shows him with a distinct mustache and goatee, just as Kesler 
described him to dispatch. See Exhibit 7. Although the mustache and goatee were not fully 
grown, they were visible features on defendant. As Kesler explained at trial, the facial hair 
"wasn't thick, it was just a little facial hair." R. 157: 123. In other words, Kesler's 
description of the perpetrator "was generally consistent with defendant's appearance, and it 
was the jury's duty [and right] to resolve the reliability of the testimony." See Nebeker, 657 
P.2datl362.2 
2
 Defendant also points to Kesler's testimony at the preliminary hearing describing the 
robber as bald. Aplt. Brf. at 32. As noted by defendant, Kesler explained at trial that he was 
describing defendant as he appeared at the preliminary hearing, not at the time of the robbery. 
R. 157: 145-47. Again, any discrepancy in description is an issue of credibility to be 
resolved by the factfinder. See Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1362-63. 
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B- THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE VICTIM'S 
CAR WAS TAKEN BY MEANS OF FORCE OR FEAR 
Defendant also contends that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to 
make a prima facie showing that he took the car "by means of force or fear" as required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-30l(l)(a) (1999). Aplt. Brf. at 33-35. He argues that the State 
cannot meet its prima facie case of "force or fear" in the absence of any verbal threats or 
"pronounced gestures calculated to appear as if he had a gun or that readily lent themselves 
to such an inference." Aplt. Brf. at 34-35. To the extent defendant argues that any nonverbal 
threat must be accompanied by a verbal threat, he is mistaken. 
Certainly, evidence of a verbal threat will meet the "force or fear" requirement, even 
absent actual possession of the weapon necessary to carry out the threat. See State v. Adams, 
830 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah App. 1992) (finding evidence of aggravated robbery sufficient 
where defendant verbally threatened to shoot victim even though he did not actually possess 
a gun). Moreover, although no Utah court has addressed the sufficiency of nonverbal threats, 
nothing in the statute suggests that nonverbal threats alone could not satisfy the requirement. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court's analysis of its robbery statute applies with equal force here: 
The legislative intent of the robbery statute is to reach all forms of express and 
implied threat immediately to inflict bodily injury as a result of which the 
accused takes property from the victim. The unique feature of robbery is the 
victim's relinquishing property in the face of the immediate possibility of the 
actor's execution of [a] threat to do bodily harm. The language used [in the 
statute] contemplates purposeful behavior and focuses upon the accused's 
purposeful conduct in conveying, by either express verbal threats or implicit 
nonverbal physical movement or both, that harm will immediately result if the 
victim resists the taking. 
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Goodxvine v. State, 764 P.2d 680, 682 (Wyo. 1988) (emphasis added).3 See also Ross v. 
State, 57 S.W.2d 152, 158 (Ark. 2001) (recognizing that threat requirement under robbery 
statute may be express or implied). In other words, the "force or fear" requirement will be 
satisfied if the defendant's actions reasonably led the victim to fear for his or her safety. See 
Adams, 830 P.2d at 313 (observing that defendant's threats and actions led victim "to believe 
he had a gun and reasonably fear for her physical safety"). 
The State's evidence of "force or fear" was sufficient to warrant submission of the 
question to the jury. Kesler testified that when he opened his car door to confront the robber, 
defendant reached down under his shirt to his waist with his right hand "like he was reaching 
for a weapon." R. 157:113-14,137. Kesler testified that although defendant said nothing to 
him, defendant's actions frightened him, making him "feel as though [his] life was in 
danger." R. 157: 114, 138, 153-54. Kesler further testified that had defendant had 
"something to say to [him] he would have said it, but he didn't look like he was worried 
about anything but getting the car." R. 157: 153-54. Kesler explained that by reaching 
underneath his shirt, defendant told him, "without words, that he was taking [his] car with or 
without [his] permission." R. 157: 154. 
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, see Taylor, 884 P.2d at 1296, 
defendant's menacing gesture can reasonably be interpreted as an intentional threat by 
Under Wyoming law, a person is guilty of robbery if in the course of committing a 
specified crime, he or she "threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of 
immediate bodily injury." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-40 l(a)(ii) (1982). 
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defendant to use a weapon, real or feigned, in the course of stealing Kesler's car. This is all 
that is required to survive a motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case. Where the 
State produced "some evidence" reasonably suggesting that defendant used force or fear in 
stealing Kesler's car, see Noren, 704 P.2d at 570, the trial court properly left for the jury to 
weigh the evidence and decide whether defendant's actions were in fact intended to convey 
such a threat of harm. State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980) (holding that it is the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted February 14, 2003. 
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